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AIR LAW-THE MEMORY LINGERS ON: AD COELUM
IN THE 1970's-SOME NEW APPROACHES
On December 17, 1903, Orville and Wilbur Wright ushered in the age
of airplanes with a fifty-nine second flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina.
The airplane, child of the Machine Age, grew in numbers and size over
the years; and, as its value as a passenger carrying vehicle became clear,
air carriers came into being. By 1938 air carriers had three hundred
eleven aircraft available for service.' Aircraft use as a weapon in World
War II speeded aircraft technology; and with the end of the war, air travel
by commercial carrier spurted forward. 2  The number of carrier air-
craft mushroomed from the 1938 figure to one thousand fifty-five in 1948
-- over three times the number of aircraft in service in 1938. 3 By 1969
the number had again spurted to double the 1948 total, with two thousand
four hundred and fifteen aircraft in service by carriers. 4 Add to that the
aircraft in general aviation and the total in 1969 was approximately one
hundred thirty-five thousand five hundred."
Aircraft, as the astute observer will readily note, cannot remain air-
borne indefinitely," and thus require suitable places to land. Obviously,
they must also have a place from which to become airborne. The num-
ber of airports of all types in the United States is quite large, and growing
every year. In 1959 there were six thousand four hundred twenty-six
airports recorded with the Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter
FAA).7 By 1969 the number had swelled to ten thousand eight hundred
forty-seven,8 and of these, three hundred twenty-eight had FAA-operated
control towers. 9
Every major city of today's United States has a large airport handling
great quantities of passengers and planes. 10 When these airports were
originally built, they were placed on the outskirts of the cities in order to
1. 1968 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BUREAU REPORT 157.
2. Id. at 167-68.
3. Id. at 157.
4. 1970 REPORT OF THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION 43. (Hereinafter RE-
PORT).
5. Id.
6. With apologies to the United States Air Force's inflight refueling teams.
7. REPORT, supra note 4, at 44.
8. REPORT, supra note 4, at 44.
9. REPORT, supra note 4, at 44.
10. REPORT, supra note 4, at 44-45.
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have sufficient room for expansion and to avoid residential areas. But
because one of the major purposes of the airports is the accommodation
of air travelers, good roads had to be built to the airports to make them
accessible to the central city. The growth and expansion of cities, coupled
with the trend of city dwellers to beat a retreat to suburban havens, cre-
ated a tendency of new residential developments to sprout up in the im-
mediate vicinity of the airport.1 It is easily understood why this took
place. As previously noted, the airport was connected to the central city
by a system of good roads, perhaps even freeways or expressways. It is
precisely this road network which affected the location of new residential
developments, since they also require good roads. Since airports are usu-
ally built first, the net effect is that residential developments follow the
roads to the environs of the airport.12
Thus it becomes obvious that present and future decades will see,
unless cities or counties prevent it,1" large airports serving the transpor-
tation hubs of America, surrounded by row upon row of residential dwell-
ings. Faced with a system of airports surrounded by heavily populated
residential areas, an inquiry must be made into the effect of the situation.
In 1959 the scheduled airlines had a total of one thousand eight hundred
twenty-seven fixed-wing aircraft in service, 14 and of these one thousand
five hundred thirty-one were piston driven.' 5 There were only eighty-
four jet aircraft in service in that year, with the remainder being turboprop
craft.16 By 1969 the total number of aircaft in commercial service had
increased only five hundred seventy-six.' 7 But there were now nineteen
hundred seventy-three jets in service, an increase of eighteen hundred
eighty-nine,' while piston aircraft now only numbered one hundred
twenty.' 9
11. Tondel, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, 32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 387 (1966).
12. Tondel, supra note 11, citing Testimony of Frank W. Kolk, Hearings on
Aircraft Noise Problems Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 86th and 87th Cong. 630 (1963).
13. The use of zoning or eminent domain could easily prevent residential or
light commercial buildings in the approach paths and high-decibel sound areas of
the airports. However, cities have in the past, perhaps motivated by the high fees
for building permits, ignored this viable solution. In San Francisco and Seattle-
Tacoma, for example, the city issued building permits for new airport-adjacent
residential units even though owners of residences already in the area had suits for
noise annoyance pending against the city. Tondel, supra note 11, at 391 n. 27.
14. REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
15. REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
16. REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
17. REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
18. REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
19. REPORT, supra note 4, at 46.
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To anyone but a desert-dwelling hermit, the portent of these myriad
statistics is clear. The number of airports has been increasing over the
years, and the residential developments have followed them, encircling
the landing fields in a manner that would do justice to the Sioux at Little
Big Horn. In 1969 air carrier operations at FAA-controlled fields had
reached nearly eleven million 20 and most of these flights were by jet
aircraft. In a word, this all means noise, and with the hundreds of homes
surrounding the base of the jet aircraft, it means unhappy homeowners.
In an attempt to redress their grievances against their noisy neighbors,
the homeowners began to take legal actions against the airports. Many
actions sought injunctive relief to permanently restrain the operator of the
airport from using the facilities of the field, 21 but had little success.
Only in the case of suits involving small, general-aviation airports were
injunctions granted, 22 while those involving major airports, which have
the greatest number of operations by the largest and noisiest aircraft,
were generally denied. 23
This paper concerns itself with another type of landowner action, and
that more widely sought: money damages for a prescriptive easement,
commonly known as inverse condemnation. The purpose of this com-
mentary is threefold: to discuss the relationship of the ad coelum and
overflight doctrines, and noise damage under federal and state laws to
analyze the inroads made into the overflight doctrine by state constitu-
tional provisions and court decisions; and to evaluate these changes in re-
lation to the necessary balance of the interests of the landowner with those
of the public and the airport operator.
20. REPORT, supra note 4, at 45.
21. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929 (N.D. Ohio 1930), mod.
55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932); Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464
(1948); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E.2d 245 (1942); Burnham
v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Smith v. New Eng-
land Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930); Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc.,
223 Or. 624, 355 P.2d 229 (1960); Crew v. Gallagher, 358 Pa. 541, 58 A.2d 179
(1948); Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1962);
Batcheller v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S.E.2d 529 (1940).
22. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., supra note 21; Brandes v. Mitterling,
supra note 21 (dirt runways). In the case of some small airports, partial injunc-
tions have been issued: e.g., Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., supra note 21 (enjoined
use of airport by planes larger than total capacity of four passengers and one-half
ton cargo); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., supra note 21 (flights under five
hundred feet over unimproved property).
23. E.g., Atkinson v. City of Dallas, supra note 21. See Fleming, Aircraft
Noise: A Taking of Private Property Without Just Compensation, 18 S.C. L. REV.
593, 596 (1966), and Tondel, supra note 11, at 393.
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THE OVERFLIGHT DOCTRINE
Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum: Whose is the soil, his it is up
to the sky.24  This was the ancient doctrine of ad coelum; a man who
owned property owned it not only on the surface, but all the way up to
the heavens. Apparently it was a creature of the early Roman law25
which found its way into the English common law by the time of Lord
Coke. 26 For centuries the only conflicts which were likely to occur un-
der the ad coelum doctrine would be caused by overhanging eaves, or per-
haps a neighbor's shade tree. Seldom would more than one property be
affected.
But the dawn of the air age brought new problems to conflict with ad
coelum. A balloonist or aircraft pilot necessarily would pass over a great
number of individual properties in the path of his flight. Lord Ellen-
borough recognized this when he noted:
But I am by no means prepared to say that firing across a field i:l vacuo, no part of
the contents touching it, amounts to a clausum fregit. Nay, if this broad over-
hanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would follow then an aeronaut is
liable to an action of trespass quare clausun fregit at the suit of the occupier of
every field over which his balloon passes in the course of his voyage. 27
It becomes clear what a problem ad coelum would be in regard to a
transcontinental flight, which passes over countless properties along its
route.
This problem was recognized in United States v. Causby,28 where the
court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, stated that "that doctrine has
no place in the modem world. . . . Common sense revolts at the idea."' 29
But this was not merely the opinion of the justices. Congress had already
examined the ad coelum doctrine in relation to modem air transportation
and found it unworkable. They changed the doctrine by statute, s0 an-
nouncing that the United States has "complete and exclusive national
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 453 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
25. For'a detailed dissertation on the historical development of the ad coelum
doctrine see Bouv6, Private Ownership of Airspace, 1 AIR L. REV. 232, 237, 1376
(1930); and Sweeney, Adjusting the Conflicting Interests of Landowner and Avia-
tor in Anglo-American Law, 3 J. AIR L. & COM. 329, 531 (1932).
26. 2 BLACKSTONE COMM. 18 (Lewis ed. 1902); 1 COKE INSTITUTES ch. 1, par.
1(4a)(19th ed. 1832); 3 KENT COMM. 621 (Gould ed. 1896).
27. Pickering v. Rudd, 171 Eng. Rep. 70, 71-72 (N.P. 1815).
28. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
29. Id. at 261.
30. Air Commerce Act of 1926, 49 U.S.C. § 171, as amended by the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 401 (1966).
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sovereignty in the air space. .... -1 over the country. As to cases in-
volving the United States, Congress had modified the ad coelum doctrine;
and, as will be discussed below, subsequent statutes and cases modified
it further.
In addition to the ad coelum theory, there are at least four other theories
as to the ownership of airspace expressed in state court decisions. One
is the theory that the landowner owns the land subject to an easement or
privilege of flight in the public; a theory followed in Florida, Delaware,
and Michigan at one time or another.32 Another theory, followed in
Massachusetts, is that the landowner owns the airspace up to the height
fixed by statute, and any flights under that height are trespass.38
A more widely accepted theory is that the landowner owns the land
as far as it is possible for him to use it.A4 Under this theory the owner of
a lot in downtown Chicago or Manhatten is possessed of a greater right
than, for example, the owner of two acres in Death Valley, because the
possible use of the land by the former is more attuned to skyscapers.
This theory and its offshoot, holding that there is ownership in what is
actually occupied or probably will be, are more far-reaching and realisitic
in their approach, because they balance the needs of the landowner
against public transportation interests.
Since the ad coelum doctrine had been denied by Congress as being
the law of the land, it was no longer a viable ground for suit in recompense
for noise damage. The fifth amendment states: "nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' ' 35  Since tres-
pass was not a basis of attack on noisy aircraft, perhaps the fifth amend-
ment would apply, at least in the case of United States-owned aircraft.
When farmer Causby's chickens developed their suicidal tendencies,
suit was brought against the federal government on the grounds of fre-
quent and regular overflights of the plaintiff's property by United States
31. 49 U.S.C. § 176(a).
32. Pogue and Bell, The Legal Framework of Airport Operations, 19 J. AIR
L. & COM. 253, 255 (1952), citing Reaver v. Martin Theatres of Florida, 46 So. 2d
896 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1951); Vanderslice v. Shawn, 26 Del. Ch. 225, 27 A.2d 87
(1942); Guith v. Consumers Power Co., 36 F.2d 21 (D.C. Mich. 1940).
33. Id. at 256, citing Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., supra note 21, and
Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., supra note 21.
34. Id. at 256, citing Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., supra note 21; Delta
Air Corp. v. Kersey, supra note 21; Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173
S.E. 817 (1934); and Dutton v. Mendocino County, 1949 U.S. Av. R. 1 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. Mendocino County 1948).
35. U.S. CONST., amend. V.
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aircraft at low altitudes. 36 The United States Court of Claims had held
that the flights had rendered the property unusable as a chicken farm,
and that as a result the United States had acquired an easement over the
Causby farm worth two thousand dollars.
8 7
The Court in Causby pointed out that ad coelum is not necessary for a
recovery of damages by inverse condemnation-a fifth amendment taking.
The government conceded that if the land were uninhabitable, there would
be a taking. 38 The difference here was that the land still had a use and
value, but the use had been limited and value diminished by the flights.
3 9
The Court went on to hold that a partial taking, duly compensable, had
occurred because the flights were not within the navigable airspace de-
fined by Congress, and because they had diminished the value of the
private property. 40 However, since the Court of Claims had failed to
define the easement which it found to exist, the case was remanded to it for
further definition. 41
The decision in Causby had many effects. It caused a change in the
statutory definition of navigable airspace, to include now the "airspace
needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft. ' ' 42  This
change might have had a dulling effect on Causby. In addition, Causby
now became a rallying point for homeowners afflicted by frequent, low
overflights, as shown in the cases which follow. It became, as well, a de-
fense for the United States in those cases where there were no overflights.
The legislative changes of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 43 would
seem to put an end to Causby by making navigable airspace more broad.
However, in Griggs v. Allegheny County,44 decided after the 1958 Act,
the court upheld Causby while finding an easement to exist even though
overflights were within the navigable airspace. In Griggs the flights over
the plaintiff's home were in compliance with Civil Aeronautics Adminis-
tration (hereinafter CAA) regulations, although they were quite low and
extremely noisy. 45 Justice Douglas again gave the opinion of the Court,
36. Supra note 28, at 258.
37. Supra note 28, at 259.
38. Supra note 28, at 261.
39. Supra note 28, at 262.
40. Supra note 28, at 263-65.
41. Supra note 28, at 268.
42. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1966). (Minimum
safe altitudes were defined by regulation as 1000 'in congested areas and 500' in other
areas. 14 C.F.R. § 60.17).
43. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (1966).
44. 369 U.S. 84 (1961).
45. Id. at 86-87.
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and stated that, as was pointed out in Causby, the use of land presupposes
the use of some of the airspace above it. This, in turn, leads to the con-
clusion that the use of superadjacent airspace will often affect the use of
the surface. 46
In making his determination that an easement had been taken, Justice
Douglas drew an analogy to the case of a bridge. A bridge without ap-
proaches to it is unusable, and in acquiring the necessary approaches, at
least an easement must be taken from the land adjacent.4 7  "The glide
path for the northeast runway is as necessary for the operation of the air-
port as is a surface right of way for operation of a bridge .... -48 The
Court concluded that there was a taking without compensation because
the airport authority did not acquire easements necessary to the operation
of the airport.49
The opinions in Causby and Griggs point out that the common law doc-
trine of ad coelum has fallen by the wayside. They still allow a recovery
for noise damage by means of a taking under the fifth amendment, or as it
is applied to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. But have these cases really done away with the ad coelum theory?
Causby states boldly that it has, and it does, at least to the extent of the
minimum altitude for navigable airspace. But if the flight be below that
imaginary line, then the possibility of use by the landowner gives him
full rights to it. "We think that the landowner, as an incident to his own-
ership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same category
as invasions of the surface." 50  Although the flights must be of a con-
tinuous nature, is this not ad coelum modified to a point where it reads
"whose is the soil, his it is up to the minimum altitude of the navigable
airspace fixed by Congress?"
Griggs is even worse. While claiming to hold to the tenets of Causby,
it states, in effect, that there can be a taking by a private party (the air-
port) of an area proclaimed to be in the public domain. We now see
a theory that all navigable airspace is in the public domain, but that ad
coelum applies if flights in that airspace are too frequent and too noisy.
One can be certain that an animal is extinct when its spoor is no longer
46. Id. at 88-89.
47. Id. at 89-90.
48. Id. at 90.
49. Id. Black, J., dissenting, discusses the case and feels that, while there was
indeed a taking by easement, that taking was done when Congress declared approach
paths part of the navigable airspace. Id. at 91-94.
50. Supra note 28, at 265.
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found. This would, by analogy, be similar to the case of legal fictions.
And the trail of ad coelum abounds in federal decisions.
In Nunnally v. United States5' there were only a few isolated over-
flights, not in the regular flight plans, over plaintiff's property. The court
affirmed a judgment of no taking, citing Causby. " 'Flights over private
land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a di-
rect and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.'
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 . . . There is no evidence
of frequent, low flights in this case." 52  Is this not the modified ad
coelum? Since there were no low, noisy overflights, there was no taking.
One of the more clear-cut cases in which the court-modified ad coelum
doctrine shows itself is Batten v. United States.53 In that case home-
owners near Forbes Air Force Base in Kansas sued on the basis of taking
by noise and shock waves in violation of the fifth amendment. Here,
however, although there was little question as to the noise, the plaintiff's
property lay outside the flight path of the field. There were no over-
flights, and for this reason alone the court held that no constitutional taking
had occurred. The court cites Nunnally, Causby, and Griggs; and in
dealing with plaintiffs' contentions that the actual damages in Causby re-
sulted from noise and vibration travelling vertically; and thus, there should
be no difference if they are travelling horizontally, 54 it states that,
"[a]bsent . . . physical invasion recovery has been uniformly denied." 55
Since physical invasion, and not the damage done by it, appears to be the
key, we are once again back to ad coelum, albeit modified. One question
the court leaves unanswered is this: Are not shock and sound waves,
and dust and smoke physical things, moving across the plaintiff's property,
causing damage? Must the physical invasion be made by some object
visible to the naked eye? But then smoke and dust would count. Or
must it be invasion by a large object?
Batten is profuse in citing Causby with one breath and ignoring it with
the next. "The plaintiffs do not suggest that any home has been made
uninhabitable. . . ."" But Causby held that in total destruction of use
taking was axiomatic,57 and that there could be a taking without com-
51. 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956).
52. Id. at 524.
53. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
54. Id. at 583-84.
55. Id. at 584.
56. Id. at 585.
57. Supra note 28, at 261.
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plete destruction.58 Batten states that although there is interference with
the use and enjoyment of the land there is no taking because the causes
of the interference are not directed at the plaintiff.59 At whom are they
directed? Why must they be directed at anyone? Only the ad coelum
doctrine can offer escape to the government. The Batten Court also
states that Causby indicates in no way that noise vibration or smoke from
two thousand feet vertically could be a taking.60 Perhaps the court has
forgotten what it read in Griggs, where the taking was done from within
the navigable airspace, the major distinction from Causby,61 upon which
Griggs claims to rely.
Avery v. United States6 2 had all things for all men. The plaintiffs
were basically in three groups: in one, there was an easement by con-
demnation, and a subsequent taking was alleged for overflights by new,
bigger jet aircraft. In a second there were overflights, but all over five
hundred feet. And in the third, a good deal of damage was caused by
blast, shock, and sound waves, plus great quantities of odorous smoke; but
no overflights occurred. Based on earlier decisions, the results are obvi-
ous. The first group has a subsequent easement; the second, nothing, be-
cause the overflights are in the navigable airspace (but what about
Griggs.); and the third group has no grounds at all, as the court daintily
sidesteps the question by relying on Batten.6 3
Ad coelum had not really ceased to exist as a result of the Causby deci-
sion; it had primarily been modified, changed to fit the problems of the air
age. No longer did the property owner hold claim via trespass to all the
airspace above his land. He still had his action for trespass, but he had to
prove much more than a simple entry into his airspace. To be a trespass
for which compensation would be granted, there had to be frequent inva-
sion at a flight level low enough to deprive the owner of the full use and
enjoyment of his property. If he could show this, an action would lie
and compensation be given by the Federal government by way of the
Tucker Act. 64
AD COELUM AT THE STATE LEVEL
Approximately twenty-four of the states have constitutional provisions
58. Supra note 28, at 262.
59. Supra note 53, at 585.
60. Supra note 53, at 585.
61. Supra note 44, at 88-89.
62. 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. C1. 1964).
63. Id. at 645.
64. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(2) (1964).
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concerning use of private property which are in line with the Federal
Constitution's taking provisions,65 in that they are similarly worded.
Because of the similarity of wording, one would expect a certain similarity
in decisions reached under these constitutional provisions and those under
the fifth amendment.
In Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., Inc.,66 the court reviewed
a suit for injunctive relief against overflights which were not regular and
which were above land not used by the owner, some three thousand feet
from the nearest building.67 The court anticipated Causby by holding
that since there were no regular, low overflights, there was no basis for
injunction. 8
Post-Causby cases have generally followed the overflight rule: if there
are frequent and low overflights, recovery is allowed; if not, no recovery
is forthcoming. In a 1964 Florida case, recovery for a taking was al-
lowed where there were frequent overflights at one hundred to one hun-
dred fifty feet causing vibration and sound, air pollution, and other dam-
age, at all times of the day and night. The area was recommended for
non-residential use by the FAA, and the result of the overflights, with
their attendant noise, was a depreciation of value of the land.69 The
court held that an inverse condemnation had taken place.7 0
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court found that a mandamus would lie
to compel compensation under eminent domain law where the usefulness
of plaintiffs' property had been destroyed by frequent, low overflights. 7 1
The Texas courts also follow this line of reasoning. In City of Houston
65. 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.1, n.28 (3rd Ed. 1970). The states,
and their respective constitutional provisions are: ALA, CONSr. art. I, § 23 (but there
is a provision for damage in art. XII, § 235 if the power of eminent domain is
delegated by a municipal or other corporation); CONN. CONST., art. I, § 11; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 14; IND.
CONST. art. I, § 21; IowA CONST., art. I, § 18; KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 4; MAINE
CONST. art. I, § 21; MD. CONST. art. III, §H 40, 40a; MASS. CONST. part I, art. 10;
MICH. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; NEv. CONST. art. I, § 8; N.H. CONST. part I, 12th;
N.J. CONST. art. I, § 16; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 57; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19;
ORE. CONST. art. I, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 17; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. II; WIs.
CONST. art. I, § 13.
66. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., supra note 21.
67. Id. at 514, 516, 170 N.E. at 387.
68. Id. at 526, 170 N.E. at 393-94.
69. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95, 96-97 (Fla. Ct. App.
1964).
70. Id. at 103.
71. State ex rel Royal v. City of Columbus, 3 Ohio St. 2d 154, 209 N.E.2d 405
(1965).
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v. McFadden72 damages for taking were awarded in a case in which
the plaintiff had lived in a quiet area, but suddenly found a change
brought about by extension of the runway of defendants' airport to a
point near his home. This in turn changed the altitude of flights over his
dwelling place, causing damage.73
But where no overflights at all had occurred, the state courts held to
their ad coelum-oriented approach. In Ferguson v. City of Keene,74 the
defendant built an airport in 1942. In 1947 the plaintiff purchased land
south of the north-south runway, and experienced no great difficulty.
But in 1962 the airport authority condemned land, including the west
edge of plaintiff's property, and extended the runway so that, as a final
result, the warm-up apron for take-offs was situated only a few hundred
feet directly west of the plaintiff's house. 75  Although the court duly
noted that there was noise and shock damage to the plaintiff's home, they
would not award damages because there were no overflights, hence no
invasion, and therefore, no taking. 76
The state courts in those states with a "taking" constitution have held
to the overflight theory, which is really a modified ad coelum doctrine, as
have the Federal courts. As the court pointed out in Nunnally,77 a dis-
tinction is made between "taking" and "damaging" of private property.78
It becomes clear in that opinion that the courts are afraid of the conse-
quences of allowing compensation for all damages:
If it should be held that the facts in the present case [Nunnally] constitute a taking,
any reduction in the value of property attributable to a federal activity might be
urged as a valid claim against the United States. 79
If the reduction in value of property, which is "a direct and immediate
interference with the enjoyment and use of the land . . . ,,,s8 is not the
decisive factor in determining whether or not a taking has occurred, then
the only key factor remaining is overflight, a simple trespass, an ad coelum
by another name.
But one justice in Ferguson was unimpressed with the rationale of those cases
which confine inverse condemnation to overflights. A person's property rights can
72. 420 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1967).
73. Id. Texas is a "damage" state, but the court decided the case on the basis
of overflight. See note 80, infra.
74. 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968).
75. Id. at 409-10, 238 A.2d at 1-2.
76. Id. at 410-13, 238 A.2d at 2-4.
77. Supra note 51.
78. Supra note 51, at 524.
79. Supra note 51, at 524.
80. United States v. Causby, supra note 28, at 266.
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be damaged as greatly by sound waves traveling horizontally as by those traveling
vertically, and to draw a distinction is to ignore reality.
Apparently not all are happy with the petty distinctions drawn by the
courts between taking and damaging.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND DECISION INROADS TO AD COELUM
Not all of the state courts have been forced into the same position as
those noted above. Approximately twenty-five states have constitutional
provisions which include both taking and damaging.81 Such provisions
were prompted by the problems entailed in the rapid growth of Chicago,
and after the inclusion of the clause in the 1870 Constitution of Illinois,
other states followed.8 2 Under a "damaging" provision, there is of
course no problem of a hair-splitting distinction between "damaging" and
"taking."
The Supreme Court of Washington discussed the matter in two cases
involving the Seattle-Tacoma Airport. In the first of these cases, multiple
plaintiffs sued the Port of Seattle, which operates the airport, on the
grounds that it failed to acquire, either by purchase or condemnation,
sufficient amounts of property in the approach paths of the airport. As a
result, they contended, the airplanes flying over or adjacent to the plain-
tiffs' properties were causing damage by noise, substantially diminishing
the value of the land. This was the Ackerman case. 8
In finding for the plaintiffs, the court discussed the taking and damag-
ing provisions of the state constitution, and from this discussion are
gleaned several informative views on what constitutes a taking. Citing
both Causby and United States v. Cress, . . . the court, quoting Cress,
stated that
it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so
81. NICHOLS, supra note 65, n.29. The states with "damaging" provisions, and
the respective sources are: ALA. CONsT. art. XII, § 235 (see note 65, supra);
ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 17; Ark. CONST. art. II, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14;
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15; GA. CONST. art I, § 3 1; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 13
[art. I, § 15, 1970 constitution]; Ky. CONST. § 13 (Property [shall not] "be taken
or applied to public use," etc.); LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13;
Miss. CONST. art. III, § 17; Mo. CONST. art. II, § 20, 21; MONT. CONST. art. III,
§ 14; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 21; N.M. CONST. art. 1H, § 20; N.D. CONST. art I,
§ 14; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §§ 23, 24; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (Same phraseology as
in Kentucky constitution.); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17;
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 58; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16;
W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9; WYo. CONST. art. I, H§ 32, 33.
82. NICHOLS, supra note 65, at 486.




long as the damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a
taking.8 4
The invasion the court speaks of is an invasion of private property, an in-
vasion which Causby and its progeny appear to hold as paramount for
recovery. The Ackerman court then seeks to define property:
What is property? In Spann v. Dallas (1921), 111 Tex. 350, 355, 235 S.W. 513,
19 A.L.R. 1387, the Texas court says: 'Property in a thing consists not merely in
its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment and
disposal. Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent
destroys the property itself. The substantial value of property lies in its use. If the
right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is
rendered a barren right.8 5
What is being said here is that not only physical invasion of property, but
anything which destroys its use, is not merely a "damaging," but is a
"taking." Damaging may be accomplished by hampering the enjoyment
of the property or the means of disposing of it, but a destruction of the
use of the property is a taking to the extent of that destruction.
If the use of the land is destroyed for a public purpose, then it becomes
a constitutional taking.
The taking or damaging of land to the extent reasonably necessary to the mainte-
nance and operation of other property devoted to a public use, is a taking or damag-
ing for a public use and subject to the provisions . . . of the state constitution.86
In this case there is a taking by the Port Authority by its failure to acquire
easements.
The Washington court was not content with these definitions, nor
were the home owners to the south of the north-south runway. The resi-
dents of a rectangular area one mile long and a half mile wide sued the
Port as the result of jet aircraft passing over on the glide path at less than
five hundred feet altitude.8 7 This action was for recovery for noise and
vibration damage. Passage of the jets ended television reception and con-
versation, it produced shock waves which loosened nails in the siding of
the plaintiffs' homes, and even loosened light fixtures by vibration.88 The
trial court held that there was a taking in the case of the overflights and
damage for the adjacent flights.8 9 But the Supreme Court tersely dis-
agreed. While affirming the damages, the court stated that there was no
84. Id. at 405, 348 P.2d at 667. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328
(1916).
85. Id. at 409, 348 P.2d at 669.
86. Id. at 413, 348 P.2d at 671-72.
87. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 311, 391 P.2d 540, 542 (1964)
cert. denied 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
88. Id. at 312, 391 P.2d at 542-43.
89. Id.
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need to distinguish taking from damaging. 90 This, of course, opens a
floodgate if accepted by federal courts, since it would render the gov-
ernment liable for any damages done.
Although the court went a bit far in Martin v. Port of Seattle9 1 in its
failure to distinguish between taking and damaging, the definition pro-
pounded in Ackerman would, if accepted by jurisdictions with "taking"-
only constitutions, be a tremendous inroad in making noise litigation so-
lutions realistic with regard to today's problems. The line of reasoning
of Ackerman and Martin is that actual physical invasion is not necessary
for a taking to have occurred, but rather when the use of the property, in
whole or in part, is substantially destroyed. This was also the reasoning
of Chief Judge Murrah of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, dissenting
in Batten.92  He, too, felt that actual physical invasion was not neces-
sary. Although it is the case that most takings involve an invasion, this
is not the universal rule. Taking may be accomplished by other means.
" 'If regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.' Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S. p.415, 43 S. Ct. p.160. ' 93  The
judge was of the opinion that a constitutional taking could be based on
indirect interference, supported by decisions such as Pennsylvania Coal
Co.94  Judge Murrah then questioned the reasoning of the Court, and
indeed, the reasoning of all courts which cling tenaciously to the overflight
doctrine:
As I reason, the constitutional test in each case is first, whether the asserted interest
is one which the law will protect; if so, whether the interference is sufficiently
peculiar, and of sufficient magnitude to cause us to conclude that fairness and
justice, as between the State and the citizen, requires the burden imposed to be
borne by the public and not by the individual alone.
Indeed, my brothers impliedly embrace this theory when they indicate that if the
governmental interference in this case had rendered the plaintiffs' homes totally
uninhabitable, the damages would have been compensable, as for a constitutional
taking. But, they then say, that since there is 'nothing more than an interference
with use and enjoyment' of the property, the admitted damages are merely 'conse-
quential.' This leaves me in doubt as to whether compensation is denied because
the interest asserted is not one which the law will protect, as in United States v.
Willow River Power Co., supra, [324 U.S. 499(1944)] or whether the interference
with a protectable property right was not sufficiently direct, peculiar and grave to
justify a conclusion of 'taking.' If the decision is based on the latter premise, I
must inquire at what point the interference rises to the dignity of a 'taking?' Is
90. Id. at 313, 391 P.2d at 546.
91. Id.
92. Supra note 53.
93. Supra note 53, at 586.
94. Supra note 53, at 586.
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it when the window glass rattles, or when it falls out; when the smoke suffocates
the inhabitants, or merely makes them cough; when the noise makes family con-
versation difficult, or when it stifles it entirely? In other words, does the 'taking'
occur when the property interest is totally destroyed or when it is substantially
diminished? 9 5
What Judge Murrah and the Ackerman line of reasoning are saying is
that there is indeed a distinction between taking and damaging, but that
the distinction is not one wherein taking means total destruction of use,
but rather one wherein taking means substantial diminishing or destruction
when viewed in relation to the interests of the parties to the suit and the
public, without regard to whether or not any overflight has occurred. 96
This theory has to date not met with widespread acceptance in "taking"
jurisdictions. However, a 1963 Oregon Supreme Court decision, Thorn-
burg v. Port of Portland,97 felt that this was indeed the better theory.
In that case the plaintiffs sought recovery for inverse condemnation on the
basis of noise-nuisance. Their home was situated under the glide path of
one runway, but six thousand feet past the end of it. It was also about
fifteen hundred feet past the end of a second runway, but one thousand
feet to the side of that runway's glide path. The complaint was not based
on overflight, but rather on jet aircraft noise which allegedly interferred
with the use and enjoyment of their property. The plaintiffs claim that
such a nuisance could become a prescriptive easement if done by a private
party, and when done by the government it can likewise become an ease-
ment. They further contended that this noise easement, which could
concededly be acquired by overflight, should be the same for close, but
not overhead, aircraft passage. The trial court, however, found that since
there was no overflight there was no taking.98
The high court, in reviewing the case, examined Batten, with its similar
factual situation, and determined that the court there used circular reason-
ing in reaching its decision. They felt that the dissent of Chief Judge
Murrah had been the better law.99 The court pointed out that noise
can be a nuisance,' 00 and when the noise is unreasonable, an easement
95. California, also a "damaging" jurisdiction, follows the Ackerman line of rea-
soning, with the modification that no recovery is allowed for mere diminution of
enjoyment, but only for some physical injury, which may be shown by a loss of
value. Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Avi. 17,642 (Los Angeles County Sup.
Ct., 1970). The case also contains an excellent discussion of the effects of jet
aircraft noise.
96. Supra note 53, at 587.
97. 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1963).
98. Id. at 181-84, 376 P.2d at 101-02.
99. Id. at 190, 376 P.2d at 104.
100. Id. at 183, 376 P.2d at 102, citing annotation at 44 ALR 1381, 1394
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
by prescription could be acquired at common law.10 1 The court went
on to point out that "[ilf the government substantially deprives the owner
of the use of his land, such deprivation is a taking for which the govern-
ment must pay."'1 2  This being the case, if a government-caused nui-
sance substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of property, that
nuisance is a taking.10 3
The defense raised arguments that there was no overflight, hence no
invasion, hence no taking. But the court felt that if noise from above
could be a nuisance amounting to an easement, the same would be true
for noise coming from the side.104  Perhaps the court felt that since
Causby had held ad coelum abolished, a simple trespassory invasion of
airspace was not the basis for recovery in noise cases, but rather that the
basis was a noisy invasion, that is, an invasion, continuous or often re-
peated, which produced damaging amounts of noise. It appeared that
the noise quality of the invasions, rather than the invasions themselves,
which gave rise to the finding of a taking. And if this were the case, then
a noise of like or more destructive quality from the horizontal, amounting
to a destructive nuisance, was also a taking, at least by way of logic.
As to the argument of no liability for noise from aircraft in the navi-
gable airspace, the court dismissed that idea with almost a flourish. They
pointed out that all flights in the navigable airspace were not per se free
of liability, on the basis of the Griggs decision, in which the aircraft pro-
ducing the sound were within the navigable airspace as determined by
Congress. 1 5 The case was remanded for a new trial, with an instruc-
tion that a five hundred foot limit on noise easements was not the law of
property, and it was a question for the jury as to what damage, if any,
had occurred. 106
Thus, in Thornburg a taking jurisdiction had found a taking to have
occurred without an overflight. This, perhaps, more than the mere
(1953) (dance halls); Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 PA. L. REV. 567 (1934); de
Funiak, Equitable Relief Against Nuisances, 38 Ky. L.J. 223 (1949), Note, 15 ORE.
L. REV. 268 (1936).
101. Id. citing Sturges v. Bridgman, L.R. 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879); RESTATEMENT
OF PROPERTY § 451 comment a.
102. 233 Ore. 178, 189, 376 P.2d 100, 105 (1963).
103. Id. at 190, 376 P.2d at 105.
104. Id. at 192, 376 P.2d at 106.
105. Id. at 196, 376 P.2d at 108.
106. Id. at 198, 376 P.2d at 111. On remand the jury found for defendant and
the case was again appealed. In a second decision, the Supreme Court ruled in
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966) that there was
error in instruction on the social utility of the airport. "The question of primary
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words of Causby, puts an end to ad coelum. But will Thornburg have
any effect on the stare decisis-bound judicial restraint advocates? Nun-
nally noted that it feared the floodgate being opened by just such a deci-
sion.107 Will Thornburg indeed cause a flood of taking cases?
THORNBURG AND TOMORROW-THE EFFECT ON
NOISE LITIGATION PROBLEMS
To the present time Thornburg's precedent remains virtually untapped.
Perhaps this is due in great part to the fact that major airports, while in
planning stages in Chicago, for example, are not being built at this time;
and those which are in service have already been so surrounded by resi-
dential areas that there is no place left to build in airport areas. The
advent of new airports and new, bigger and noisier jet aircraft may
change this.
As pointed out previously, Nunnally v. United States expressed fear
that a decision which held that noise alone, without physical invasion by
overflight, could constitute a taking, would open a floodgate holding the
United States liable for almost anything.'08 But this is not what Thorn-
burg says. It holds rather that noise can be a taking if it causes substantial
destruction of the use and enjoyment of property.10 9
The question then raised is will this decision, and its attendant line of
reasoning, have a seriously detrimental effect on airport operations. As
pointed out above, residential areas adjacent to airports are a fact. At
least as to airports yet to be built, perhaps government units will have the
foresight to protect themselves from lawsuits by effective zoning, which
up until now they have not done.110 However, in a day of clamor in
regard to overcrowding, a city cannot simply leave a large dead space
around an airport. It would be forced to exercise its eminent domain
powers to remove residences already in the area of new construction, by
virtue of the constitutional taking provisions of state and federal constitu-
tions. The land around an airport's periphery would not be well suited
for recreational purposes, since if peace and quiet are lacking, as they
importance was whether or not the overflights and flight patterns created so sub-
stantial an interference with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land, as measured
by a decline in the fair market value thereof, as to constitute a taking." Id. at
72, 415 P.2d at 751-52. The court again reversed and remanded for still a third
trial.
107. Supra note 51, at 524.
108. Supra note 51, at 524.
109. Supra note 96, at 190, 376 P.2d at 105.
110. See Tondel, supra note 11.
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most probably would be around an airport approach area, the main pur-
pose of recreation would be gone. Industrial use would undoubtedly be
the best purpose for land within the heavy noise areas. But here another
problem is created. Large factories might be built, but the industrial area
would of necessity be confined to use by light manufacture since most air-
ports have restrictions as to height of structures and smoke in the approach
areas governed by FAA safety rules."1  Thus, while zoning can help to
alleviate many of the airport's noise problems, it must be carefully planned.
In one aspect, for cetain, Thornburg-type decisions will be a greater
burden. They will surely impose more of a liability on airports than the
Causby overflight theory. However, it would seem that a balancing of
interests between the rights of the landowner and the rights of the airport
operator and the rights of the public to transportation need to be struck.
Causby in its historical content may have struck the balance, but the ad-
vent of new, more powerful-and more noisy-aircraft made the rea-
soning less tenable, while the courts held to it more tenaciously. By this
line of reasoning an airport merely had to keep clear a space over which
aircraft would directly pass, and those on either side be damned.
It is fairly common knowledge that high-pitched sound will shatter
glass. Yet the overflight doctrine holds that unless the sound comes from
somewhere in the airspace overhead, the damage is as nought. This is
ad coelum reasoning, for it makes trespass itself the sine qua non for re-
covery. Even if the noise by the jet plane passing next door is so great
that it blasts out every window and door, that sound is not a taking unless
it completely annihilates the premises. Such is the reasoning of overflight
theory. It defies logic. This chop-logic goes to such extremes as to
hold, in Avery v. United States112 that no taking occurs when dust
and smoke are blown across the property and the noise vibration is strong
enough to shake fruit from the trees,"13 solely because there was no
overflight. There is no balance of interests in such a decision.
Thornburg seeks to retain this balance in the face of technological ad-
vance. Does this hurt the airport operator unwarrantedly? Why should
the airport operator be allowed to shield himself under public interest and
profit by his own lack of foresight? It was the governmental unit which
allowed building to go on, and now it uses public interest to profit from
building permit fees and at the same time protect itself from suit. Un-
111. Seago, The Airport Noise Problem and Airport Zoning, 28 MD. L. REV.
120 (1968).
112. Supra note 62.
113. Supra note 62, at 644.
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fortunately, Thornburg has not taken hold. Cases under "taking" constitu-
tions have arisen since its time, but they continue to follow the old fic-
tion." 4 In states with "taking and damaging" provisions, the problem
is much smaller, but the other states continue to flaunt fiction in the face
of logic, and to hold to a doctrine which swings the balance of interest dis-
proportionately.
The late Justice Frankfurter once wrote "there comes a point where
this Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men."' 15
Until that time comes, it appears that the homeowner will be bound by an
ancient common law doctrine, far out of tune with the world of today,
which, while declared legally dead, lurks in the shadows of legal fiction,
disguised by judicial modification and name change. But the floodgates
may have been opened at last by Ackerman, Thornburg and cases which
follow their reasoning, a theory which gives better balance of interest, and
which follows a more logical appoach. Perhaps these decisions will
produce a flood that washes away the ad coelum doctrine back to the
oblivion of the Roman Forum where it is better suited for survival. Some-
times a good washing down is a most soothing process.
Terrence J. Benshoof
114. See United States v. Avery, supra note 62; Ferguson v. City of Keene,
supra note 74.
115. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).
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